We’ve made a considerable investment in blood and
money in Afghanistan. The changes that all the sacrifice bought are
mostly cosmetic, and we’re learning that cosmetic changes last about as
long on an 8th-century culture as lipstick on a pig. Tribal warfare is
the national sport and the gross national product, insofar as anyone can
find it big enough to measure, consists mostly of refugees and
asylum-seekers. Coffin-makers do a good business but almost nobody else
does.
This is the land that hope and change forgot, and President Obama is
determined to bring most American troops home, or at least to send them
to another semi-hopeless place. The alternative to doing nothing may be
even more dreadful, but the depth of American frustration in Afghanistan
is measured in two U.S. audits that spell out why a world policeman’s
lot is not a happy one. Not in the Middle East, anyway.
The first internal audit, uncovered by the Washington Guardian, an aggressive Web newspaper (
washingtonguardian.com),
concludes that the Afghan military, despite years of expensive American
tutoring and training, is only “marginally capable of repelling attacks
from the Islamist extremists who antagonize large parts of the
country.”
The Afghan National Army still has weak command and control
capabilities, and only succeeds on the battlefield with American and
allied assistance. “Assistance” usually means the Afghans step back and
let the Americans and the allies do the heavy lifting - when they’re not
doing the dying. The Afghans can sometimes steer the car in a wobbly
more or less straight line, but only as long as daddy’s there to
accelerate, brake and supervise.
“In its present state of development and given the threat
environment,” the Defense Department inspector general concluded, “we
found the [Afghan] command, control and coordination system to be
marginally sufficient to respond effectively to insurgent attacks . . .
and to conduct effectively other short-term offensive operations.”
Translated from government-speak, the inspector general concludes that
this is the army that can barely shoot straight when it shoots at all.
It’s not altogether the fault of the men in the ranks. One
high-ranking U.S. officer who has worked directly with Afghan forces
tells the Guardian that even after meeting basic levels of competence,
the Afghan soldier’s efforts are undermined by corruption in the
government of President Hamid Karzai. “If the Afghan soldier doesn’t get
paid when he’s supposed to, he will either leave or get recruited by
the enemy.” The pay from the enemy may not be better or even more
forthcoming, but looting opportunities are more abundant. Men in the
highest ranks of the government do it, so why not the dogface soldiers?
This hasn’t been a happy spring in Afghanistan. In trying to impose
the 21st century on the reluctant country, the Americans are building
first-world hospitals that probably won’t be sustainable in the third
world when Mr. Obama delivers on his promise to quit the battlefield.
The Guardian reports
that one of the two hospitals the Americans are building in eastern
Afghanistan will be 12 times the size of the hospital it replaces, and
annual maintenance costs will soar to $3.2 million. The other hospital
now spends $98,000 annually on maintenance and will have to come up with
$587,000 annually to maintain the replacement.
The U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, says it has
been assured by the Afghan government there will be “no problem.” It’s
not rocket science to figure out who the Afghans expect to pick up the
check. The skeptical inspector general says USAID could make better use
of the money available for the five hospitals the agency funds. Three of
the five have no anesthesiologist, two have no obstetrician or
gynecologist and one has no pediatrician. But the two new hospitals,
built at a cost of $18.5 million, will by shiny and new.
President Hamid Karzai (USAF photo)
Nation-building is for suckers, as we learn to considerable pain.
It’s probably not possible to avoid trying to resolve the problems of
others, but we should do it only when those problems, left unresolved,
make trouble for us. And we shouldn’t expect to make good small-d
democrats or small-r republicans out of those who prefer to live in the
squalor of the 8th century. It’s important to keep great expectations
realistic.
Wesley Pruden is editor emeritus of The Washington Times.
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